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Abstract 
This paper presents a framework for assessing and managing risks of personnel responding to emergencies requiring 
escape on offshore installations. Personnel’s action or response can be affected by human factors during the emergency 
escape. The framework has four categories: analyzing human factors in safety barriers for emergency escape, quantifying 
the failure probability of personnel’s response, assessing risks associated with personnel’s response, and managing the 
risk associated with personnel’s response. The first category requires defining and arranging safety barriers for emergency 
escape based on the Swiss cheese model. Both second and third categories calculate the probability of personnel failing 
to respond to emergency escape using Bayesian analysis. A safety hierarchy for managing risks associated with 
personnel’s response is introduced in the fourth category.    
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Activities of emergency escape on offshore installations expose personnel to a certain risk level and are dependent on 
their response to prevent themselves from the escalating emergency scenario. Ineffective personnel’s responses could 
contribute to high level of risks. Ineffective personnel’s responses could be caused by the presence of human factors in 
safety barriers and emergency escape plan.  
Examples of these human factors include late activation of an emergency alarm, ineffective command and control, 
communication problems, inadequate refresher training, and insufficient training as a team on offshore installations [8, 
7, 2, 22]. The emergency escape during the Macondo blowout was unsuccessful due to the presence of human factors 
such as lack of emergency drills and exercises, poor emergency escape plan, and ineffective communication on emergency 
situation [19].  
The presence of human factors in emergency escape on offshore installations has been studied by many researchers [8, 7, 
2, 22]. The researchers focused only on the estimation of human error probability (HEP) and risk analysis. DiMattia et al. 
[5] determined human error probabilities of escape and evacuation on offshore installations using a success likelihood 
index method (SLIM). Khan et al. [9] designed a tool known as human error probability index (HEPI) that uses SLIM to 
assess human errors during escape and evacuation on offshore platforms. Deacon et al. [4] developed a framework for 
calculating the human error probabilities for escape, evacuation, and rescue (EER) on offshore installations. Studies on 
human error probabilities are more relevant to a risk assessment of escape and evacuation on offshore installations.  
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2.0 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Human factors and technical aspects can be integrated in the risk management of offshore installations [18]. The risk 
assessment and management of personnel’s responses during emergency escape must include human factors. The 
challenge for assessing risks is to incorporate human factors into both qualitative and quantitative analyses. Human factors 
in the emergency escape plan such as poor communication and ineffective training are complicated to measure and assess.   
The risk assessment and management for emergency escape are important to operators and personnel working on offshore 
installations. The risk assessment could inform the level of risks associated with personnel’s responses that have been 
affected by human factors. The presence of human factors in safety barriers or emergency escape plan must be controlled 
or managed to improve the safety of emergency escape. 
 
3.0 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this paper is to present the development of a framework consisting of risk assessment and management 
of personnel’s response. The framework was developed to identify and assess human factors in safety barriers and the 
emergency escape plan of offshore installations [12]. The framework has risk management to manage or control the 
presence of human factors in emergency escape activities.   
 
4.0 SCOPE OF WORK 
This paper defines safety barriers for emergency scenarios requiring escape on offshore installations. Examples of safety 
barriers are evacuation procedures, the equipment used in the emergency escape, and personnel’s responses or actions 
required during the emergency.  
General evacuation procedures for emergency escape begin with alarms activation due to emergency scenarios such as 
hydrocarbon releases, man overboard, collisions involving vessels or helicopters, or fires and explosions. When the 
emergency alarm is activated, personnel are required to stop working and must move to escape routes leading to the 
designated muster station. 
Equipment for emergency escape includes both audible and visible alarms. Proper communication regarding the 
emergency scenario is typically done using a public address (PA) system. Escape routes and muster station with proper 
signage and lighting are made available to direct individuals to temporary safe refuge.  
This paper defines personnel’s responses according to the general implementation of emergency escape on offshore 
installations [15]. Hear alarms and listen to announcement are two examples of personnel’s responses in the event of 
emergency escape. 
 
5.0 DEVELOPMENT OF FRAMEWORK 
The framework of human factors risk assessment and management for emergency escape on offshore installations can be 
divided into to four categories: 
i) Category 1 - Identifying human factors in safety barriers,  
ii) Category 2 - Estimating the probability of personnel failing to respond, 
iii) Category 3 - Assessing risks associated with personnel’s responses, and 
iv) Category 4 - Managing risks associated with personnel’s responses in the emergency escape. 
These four categories were designed to be dependent on each other. The details of each class are discussed in Section 5.1 
to 5.4.  
 
5.1 Category 1 - Identify Human Factors in Safety Barriers 
The development of framework begins with identifying the presence of human factors in safety barriers as illustrated in 
Fig. 1. Safety barriers consisting of evacuation procedures, equipment, and actions or responses are arranged using the 
Swiss cheese model [16]. The holes in the Swiss cheese represent the human factors in evacuation procedures, equipment, 
and actions or responses. The trajectory of human factors through the holes in every safety barrier can affect personnel 
performing the emergency escape.  
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Identifying and addressing human factors in each safety barrier can be conducted in a qualitative manner. CAPP [3] and 
OGP [15] can be used as references for identifying the human factors in evacuation procedures and equipment. Blackman 
et al. [1] provided performance shaping factors that can be used as human factors affecting personnel’s responses. 
Examples of human factors present in safety barriers are listed in Table 1. The application of Category 1 of the framework 
is illustrated in [10].  
  
 
Figure 1. Procedures for identifying human factors  
 
 
Table 1. Examples of human factors in the safety barriers of emergency escape 
Safety Barriers Human Factors 
Evacuation procedures No communication to activate the emergency alarm  
Equipment No scheduled maintenance causes less effective alarm activation  
Response or actions Fatigue due to long hours of working [1] 
 
 
5.2 Category 2 - Estimate the Probability of Personnel Failing to Respond 
Fig. 2 shows the sequence for estimating the probability of personnel’s responses considering human factors in the safety 
barrier. The study extends the framework to include a model for estimating the probability of personnel failing to respond 
to emergency escape. The objective of Category 2 is to determine the failure of personnel’s responses that could have 
impact on the emergency escape.  
The study used Bayesian analysis to determine the probability of failure of personnel’s responses [17, 20, 21]. The 
analysis considers human factors in every safety barrier. The human factors in the evacuation procedures can be connected 
to equipment and personnel’s responses following the safety barrier arrangement. The interaction of human factors in 
every safety barrier is used to develop conditional probability table (CPT). The output in the CPT refers to personnel’s 
response in the event of emergency escape. The application of framework using the Bayesian analysis was discussed in 
[11].  
 
  
Figure 2. Procedures for estimating probability of personnel failing to respond 
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5.3 Category 3 - Assess Failures of Personnel’s Responses 
The framework was then designed to assess risks associated with personnel’s responses. Category 3 is an extension of 
the second part of the framework as shown in Fig. 3. It aims to analyze the probability and impacts of the failure of 
performing emergency escape considering the presence of human factors. Risks associated with personnel’s responses 
were assessed by integrating the probability of failure and its consequences.  
This paper considers hear the emergency alarm and listen to the announcement as personnel’s responses. Based on the 
defined personnel’s responses, two possible consequences of failing to respond are late arrival at the muster station and 
may involve in the escalating emergency scenario. Bayesian analysis can be used to quantify the consequence. The 
application of the framework in determining the consequences is demonstrated in [13].  
 
 
Figure 3. Procedures for assessing risks associated with personnel’s response 
 
5.4 Category 4 - Manage the Risk 
Fig. 4 presents the fourth step of the framework, which completes the development of framework. The objective of 
Category 4 is to manage or minimize risks associated with personnel’s responses affected by the presence of human 
factors. Norazahar et al. [14] presented the application of risk management of escape and evacuation on offshore 
installations.   
Risk acceptance level was used to determine whether the risk is acceptable or not, according to the safety rules or operators 
of offshore installations. If the risk is low and acceptable to the operators and safety rules, the emergency escape is 
presumed to be safe for personnel. In the case of the risk is unacceptable, it must be minimized or managed using a safety 
hierarchy.  
Fig. 5 introduces a safety hierarchy as a mechanism of risk management. The safety hierarchy has three safety steps: 
inherent safety, engineering safety, and procedural safety. Inherent safety measures consist of elimination and 
minimization of human factors, substitution of inefficient equipment, and simplification of evacuation procedures. 
Engineering safety requires adding safer equipment to the facilities provided for emergency on offshore installations. 
Two types of safer equipment are active and passive barriers. The purpose of engineering safety is to provide reliable 
safeguards for reducing risks associated with personnel’s responses. Modifications or changes to equipment must be 
followed by updating rules and procedures to allow personnel to have a better understanding of hazards, equipment, 
procedures, human factors, and environmental conditions involved in emergency situations.  
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Figure 4. Framework for assessing and managing risks associated with personnel’s responses 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Safety hierarchy for managing risks 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
A framework was developed to assess and manage risks associated with personnel’s responses during emergency escape 
on offshore installations. Human factors in safety barriers were identified using the Swiss cheese model. The human 
factors were connected to safety barriers, emergency scenarios, and personnel’s response using Bayesian analysis, which 
could also quantify the probability of failures. Consequences of personnel failing to respond to emergency scenario were 
estimated based on the presence of human factors in safety barriers. The risk associated with personnel’s responses can 
be managed or controlled using a safety hierarchy. 
For future work, an experimental study of emergency escape considering the presence of human factors should be 
conducted. The experimental data could verify the practicality of the framework to offshore industry.       
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